By John Davison
BAGHDAD, March 6 (Reuters) – Iran has spent decades and billions of dollars preparing foreign proxy fighters like A.J., a commander in a pro-Iranian paramilitary group in Iraq, for a moment just like this. Since the U.S. and Israel went to war on the Islamic Republic a week ago, A.J. has been awaiting marching orders from Tehran.
But they have yet to come. And so as the leadership in Tehran faces a potentially existential threat, many of the fighters and militia groups the Iranians cultivated in Iraq have so far not entered the fight for them. There has been no mass mobilization of Iran’s proxies inside Iraq, one of the last redoubts of the Islamic Republic’s once-formidable system of alliances stretching from Gaza, Lebanon and Syria to Yemen and Iraq.
Some pro-Iranian groups in Iraq have claimed attacks in recent days, to be sure. One group said it had fired drones at “enemy bases in Iraq and the region,” and several explosions rocked the northern city of Erbil, a Kurdish stronghold that hosts a U.S. base. But most missile and drone attacks have come directly from Iran, Kurdish officials say. The more than two-dozen attacks claimed online in the name of the Islamic Resistance of Iraq – a label used by various militants – have caused no significant damage, and in some cases there is no evidence of the attacks.
Even if direct orders do come from Tehran, A.J. believes that they’ll only be issued to two or three of the dozens of Iraqi Shi’ite Muslim paramilitaries nurtured by Iran. “I just don’t think most of them are reliable anymore,” he told Reuters. “Some will act. Others would have front groups that could launch attacks with deniability. But many are just looking out for their own interests these days.”
The trajectory of A.J.’s personal journey as a member of an Iranian-backed force in Iraq tracks the rise and fall of Iran’s strategy of spreading proxy militias through the region, under the leadership of the elite Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and its expeditionary Quds Force, to fight America and Israel. His is the story of how the Israelis and Americans wore down and diminished most of these proxies, leaving the Islamic Republic facing its most perilous moment largely alone.
A.J., who is from Shi’ite-majority southern Iraq, spoke on condition he not be identified, for fear of being targeted by Israeli or U.S. strikes. Reuters is using the initials of one of his nicknames for clarity.
A.J. blamed several factors for the reduced military potency of Iran’s Iraqi proxies: Israel and America’s war of attrition against other regional allies, the loss of Syria as a supply line, and the transition of key commanders into Iraqi political and economic life.
His assessment is shared by more than two dozen people interviewed by Reuters, including militia members, Iraqi and Western officials, Shi’ite clerics, and close watchers of Iran’s once-vaunted “Axis of Resistance.” They painted a picture of a proxy network hollowed out by years of targeted assassinations of hard-to-replace leaders; the loss of secure bases for training and weapons transit; and the transformation of Iraqi commanders into wealthy politicians and businessmen with more to lose than gain from confronting the West.
The Iraqi militia leaders “don’t want sanctions on them as individuals, they want to have access to Western healthcare, to have their children educated abroad,” said Gareth Stansfield, a professor of Middle East politics at Exeter University and senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, who has advised the British and regional governments. “That’s accelerated since the 12-day war” between Israel and Iran last June, he said.
Iraqi security officials and paramilitary insiders say Iran’s proxies could yet enter the fray in force if the war drags on, if there’s a U.S.-Israeli attack they perceive as being against Shi’ites as a whole, or if U.S.-backed Kurdish groups attack Iran.
Even if they wanted to fight, though, these Iran-backed groups lack the means they once had. They have used outmoded weaponry in their handful of attacks since the war began, according to Iraqi security officials. Tehran has sent no new weapons to his group since the battle with Israel last year, A.J. said. Reuters couldn’t determine if this was the case for other pro-Iran militias in Iraq.
During last year’s confrontation with Israel, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards instructed A.J.’s group to retaliate, which they did, firing drones toward Israel. But moving weapons now would be “too risky, they could be spotted by reconnaissance,” A.J. said.
Israel’s military told Reuters that “terrorist factions in Iraq operate as a proxy of Iran.”
“Operations against the Iranian-led resistance axis, combined with a clear understanding that Israel would not stand idly by as its civilians were attacked, have led to a decrease in attacks from Iraqi territory toward Israel,” it said in a statement.
The Iraqi and Iranian governments didn’t respond to Reuters questions for this story. The White House and the Pentagon also didn’t respond to requests for comment.
‘LEADERS LIKE THIS COME ALONG ONLY ONCE’
On day two of the war, A.J. and his comrades mourned Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, killed by an airstrike during the Israeli-U.S. assault on Tehran.
Still, no orders came to attack.
In Baghdad, thousands of Iraqi supporters of the ayatollah, including off-duty fighters from Iran-backed paramilitary groups, nevertheless rushed the gates of the fortified Green Zone, chanting “death to America” and hoping to attack the U.S. embassy.
They never managed to reach the bridge leading into the Green Zone, and were beaten back and tear-gassed by Iraqi riot police. None of the well-known commanders of Iranian proxy militias were in sight.
Qais al-Khazali, a U.S.-sanctioned commander whose militia’s banners were raised by the protesters, issued an anodyne statement on X condemning the U.S. and asking supporters to show their anger by “wearing black.” Khazali in years past had threatened American interests, and men he commanded had killed U.S. troops in Iraq in 2007. This time, he made no call to arms.
Khazali’s office didn’t respond to a request for comment.
One protester in Baghdad bemoaned the lack of support from top pro-Iran paramilitary leaders. “Where are you?” the protester chided in a video posted online. “If you don’t come stand with us and burn the (American) embassy, you are cowards.”
The protester was referring to a similar incident in 2019, when Iran-backed protesters and militants attacked the U.S. embassy with firebombs in response to American air raids in Iraq and Syria that killed dozens of their paramilitary comrades.
On that occasion, the leaders had stood among them, including Khazali. The moment marked a high point of Iranian Shi’ite proxy power in the region.
Sixteen years earlier, Iraqi Shi’ite militants fought the Americans with Iranian support after the 2003 U.S. invasion toppled Sunni ruler Saddam Hussein. The militants went on to embed themselves in Iraqi government institutions. The number of Shi’ite paramilitaries swelled after the rise of Islamic State in 2014, as men rushed to defend their country against the extremist Sunni group.
The Shi’ite commanders, many close to Iran for decades, capitalized on the victory over Islamic State in 2017 to win seats in parliamentary elections the next year. They also came to dominate the Popular Mobilization Forces, a 150,000-strong state paramilitary umbrella organization formed to fight Islamic State.
The growing power of Iran-backed paramilitaries in Iraq coincided with the political rise of Hezbollah in Lebanon. In Syria, President Bashar al-Assad, an Iran ally, meanwhile weathered a civil war with Iranian proxy help.
The U.S. embassy assault in 2019 would be a turning point. It triggered the U.S. assassination in early 2020 of fabled Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani, head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force, who directed overseas operations and coordinated Iran’s proxies.
The killing, ordered by President Donald Trump, sent the militias scrambling for a coordinator. Soleimani’s replacement, Esmail Ghaani, lacks the same stature and authority, many militia figures say.
A.J. proudly keeps a picture on his phone of him meeting Ghaani. But he said there’s “no comparison” between the two leaders. “Soleimani was not just a once in a generation leader, he was a once in history leader,” he said.
Reuters was unable to reach Ghaani for comment.
After Soleimani’s death, Iran’s most trusted proxy, Lebanese Hezbollah, stepped in to coordinate the various Tehran-backed groups across the region. A.J. said a Lebanese political figure close to Hezbollah would bring the factions together in Beirut to talk strategy. A.J.’s group still kept operatives in Beirut and Tehran at that time.
That would soon change.
The outbreak of war in October 2023 between Israel and Iran’s Palestinian ally Hamas drew in Hezbollah. That led to the Israeli assassination in September 2024 of Hezbollah’s charismatic leader Hassan Nasrallah.
“Nasrallah was also irreplaceable. Leaders like this come along only once,” A.J. said. The killing of Nasrallah and most of Hezbollah’s senior leadership meant Beirut was no longer safe, he said.
His group soon confined its operatives to Iraq and Tehran. “We used to train in Lebanon on drone systems. Now it’s Tehran,” he told Reuters a few days before the U.S. and Israel attacked Iran.
All the sources Reuters interviewed agreed that Nasrallah’s killing dealt a severe blow to the whole axis, impacting the Iraqis’ ability to visit Beirut.
“Everything changed after Nasrallah was killed,” said Mustafa Fahs, a Lebanese political activist in close contact with Iraqi Shi’ite leaders.
Fahs said the decapitation of Hezbollah’s leadership loosened the group’s grip on state institutions in Lebanon, including Beirut airport, depriving Iraqi proxies of a means to visit without scrutiny by Lebanese government intelligence.
In recent days, Hezbollah has managed to conduct limited attacks, firing rockets and drones into Israel from Lebanon. Hezbollah and the Lebanese government didn’t respond to requests for comment.
A SYRIAN COLLAPSE
A.J.’s group and other Iranian proxies were deployed to Syria from across the region in 2011 to prevent the collapse of Assad’s regime in an uprising that morphed into a civil war dominated by Sunni Islamist rebels. For A.J. and his comrades, the mission was to protect Shi’ite shrines in Syria. For the wider Iran-backed axis, Syria provided a crucial land route from Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon and enabled the movement of weapons and fighters across the region. With their help, plus Russian support, Assad held on.
The proxies reduced their presence in Syria around 2020 when it looked like Assad’s regime had survived, but still kept offices and weapons in Syria for use against Israel, A.J. said.
But things were changing. During a tense meeting of Iran-backed factions in Damascus in 2023, A.J. said he and fellow Iraqi commanders warned Syrian military officials that they were dangerously infiltrated by Israeli agents. “There were enemy agents everywhere in Syria, just waiting to give us away,” he said.
In the ensuing months – just before Nasrallah’s killing – Israel started assassinating Iranian commanders in Syria. Syrians bought off by Israel were giving coordinates for the attacks, A.J. said. Michael Knights, an expert on Iraqi factions at New York-based risk consultancy Horizon Engage, who has worked closely with the U.S. government in sanctions enforcement, said Israel had local agents helping provide the targeting.
The Israeli military didn’t address specific questions about the targeting of Iranian commanders in Syria.
Assad’s ouster in December 2024 was a hammer blow to Tehran and its proxies. With Iran’s axis weakened and Nasrallah dead, Syria was taken over by former Al Qaeda fighters led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, who would become the country’s president in 2025.
The sudden defeat sent the remaining pro-Iran factions scattering, with Iraqi groups withdrawing across the border.
“Damascus was the key for coordinating the axis of resistance,” A.J. said. “That was a big turning point for us.”
Syria’s government didn’t respond to questions for this story.
With Assad’s demise, the axis of resistance was largely down to just Iran, the Houthi militants of Yemen, and the Iraqi groups.
THE GOD OF MONEY
On the day before the Iran war began, a former Iraqi intelligence chief drove a Reuters correspondent around Baghdad, pointing out vast, lucrative construction projects owned by Iranian proxy militias.
“These men were made by Iran, and might ultimately prove loyal to it,” he said, referring to the militia leaders. “But there are two gods they worship above all – weapons and money.”
A few months earlier, Khazali, the U.S.-sanctioned commander, made a startling comment in a televised interview. Amid U.S. moves to get back into Iraq’s oil sector, he said American companies were welcome to come and invest. The previous year, he’d openly threatened U.S. interests if Washington backed Israeli attacks on Lebanese Hezbollah.
The apparent about-face didn’t sit well with several pro-Iran commanders in Iraq.
“The situation in Iraq now has shown who’s the true resistance (against America),” said Abu Turab al-Tamimi, a former commander linked to Iran-backed faction Kataib Hezbollah.
“The only ones left are Kataib Hezbollah, Nujaba, and a couple of others perhaps,” Tamimi told Reuters, naming two Iraqi factions that remain most loyal to Iran. He didn’t include Khazali’s group. Kataib Hezbollah and Nujaba didn’t respond to questions from Reuters.
Khazali’s militia movement spawned an affiliated political party, which he also heads. He is among a top tier of Iran-backed senior commanders who have worked their way into seats in parliament and other influential positions within the Iraqi state. They have kept their armed groups, usually folding them into the Popular Mobilization Forces, which receives an annual budget of over $3 billion from the Iraqi government. They have also forged extensive business interests.
In the process, they’ve softened their anti-American rhetoric and increasingly refrained from military action. Most of these commanders have not issued threats against the U.S. since the Iran war began, and their groups haven’t claimed new attacks on U.S. interests.
They have also privately aligned with the U.S. on Iraq’s deliberations over a new prime minister, according to all the sources Reuters interviewed, including members of the commanders’ political offices.
Khazali and Shibl al-Zaidi, another U.S.-sanctioned leader who also leads a political party, both rejected the Iran-favored pick of Nouri al-Maliki, a former prime minister whom the U.S. strongly opposed, according to people in Zaidi’s party and other Iraqi politicians.
The two commanders are going even further, reaching out to Western officials.
“The head of the British embassy’s political section met the chief of our parliamentary alliance 10 days ago (in February),” said Hussam Rabie, a spokesman for the party headed by Zaidi.
Rabie and several other Iraqi officials said Khazali was also regularly meeting European officials. Khazali and Zaidi didn’t respond to Reuters questions. The British embassy declined to comment.
Some commentators, and the Iraqi officials who oppose Iran, said these overtures might be an Iranian ploy to keep those men from being targeted by U.S. airstrikes, preserve their political power in Iraq, and use the country as a source of income.
Iran has used often-convoluted methods to get money out of Iraq via middlemen who deal in cash deliveries and oil smuggling, according to U.S. sanctions designations. But the sanctions were already choking off that money before the war.
Even if the Islamic Republic survives the U.S. and Israeli assault, proxy insiders and several Iraqi and Western officials say the recent actions of senior Tehran-backed leaders in Iraq have shown they have little interest in dying for Iran.
“The idea that the factions are under the thumb of Iran is not the case anymore,” said Stansfield.
A THREAT TO ALL SHI’ITES
On the third day of the Iran war, A.J. mourned a friend, a fighter and drone specialist from Kataib Hezbollah killed in an airstrike in Iraq. The fighter was among at least six Iran-backed militants killed in strikes since the war began.
What might yet push more Iraqi Shi’ite factions into action is not loyalty to Iran, but a feeling that their faith is under siege, according to Iraqi politicians and clerics. This could take the form of an attack on Shi’ite holy places in Iraq or sectarian violence targeting Shi’ites as a group.
“Iraqi Shi’ites share an ideology with the Islamic Republic of Iran, and that is defense of our religion,” said Sheikh Karim al-Saidi, a cleric who attended the pro-Iran protests in Baghdad. “We hope for peace, but if it comes to confrontation we’re ready.”
Many Iraqi Shi’ite paramilitaries haven’t seen full-scale war since they fought Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, known as ISIS. They say they’re ready to confront a resurgent threat from that group from across the border in Syria. U.S. support for Syria’s President Sharaa, a former Al Qaeda commander, is proof to the Iraqi paramilitaries that the U.S. is trying to push Sunni jihadists in their direction once again.
“Our leaders might be busy with politics,” said Seif, a member of Khazali’s armed group, giving only his first name. “But all we know is jihad.”
(Reporting by John Davison in Baghdad. Additional reporting by Rami Ayyub in Jerusalem. Editing by David Crawshaw, Lori Hinnant and Peter Hirschberg.)
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